Compulsory Licensing of Climate Engineering Patents: How Embracing Technology- and Research-Sharing Strategies Brings Us One Step Closer to Solving Climate Change by Hardin, Buzz
Arkansas Law Review 
Volume 73 Number 3 Article 4 
December 2020 
Compulsory Licensing of Climate Engineering Patents: How 
Embracing Technology- and Research-Sharing Strategies Brings 
Us One Step Closer to Solving Climate Change 
Buzz Hardin 
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, International Law 
Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Buzz Hardin, Compulsory Licensing of Climate Engineering Patents: How Embracing Technology- and 
Research-Sharing Strategies Brings Us One Step Closer to Solving Climate Change, 73 Ark. L. Rev. 611 
(2020). 
Available at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr/vol73/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Arkansas Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact 
ccmiddle@uark.edu. 
COMPULSORY LICENSING OF CLIMATE 
ENGINEERING PATENTS: HOW EMBRACING 
TECHNOLOGY- AND RESEARCHING-SHARING 
STRATEGIES BRINGS US ONE STEP CLOSER TO 
SOLVING CLIMATE CHANGE 
Buzz Hardin* 
I. INTRODUCTION
The impact of climate change spans the globe and includes 
increasingly severe and dangerous climate events, including 
coastal flooding, extreme heat and wildfires, reduced crop yield, 
and decreased food security.1  In the United States, if the proper 
steps toward mitigating or reversing the effects of climate change 
are not taken, it is very likely that the United States will 
experience substantial damage to its economy, the health of its 
citizens, and the environment.2  In response to the challenges 
presented by climate change, the number of inventions in the field 
of climate engineering, or “geoengineering,” has skyrocketed 
over the past several years, and the number of patent applications 
and grants for technologies in that field has similarly increased 
dramatically.3 
Because of the vital importance of mitigating the effects of 
climate change, and by extension, the importance of guaranteeing 
access to the types of technologies that, when properly developed, 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Arkansas School of Law.  The author would like
to thank Professor Sara Gosman for her enthusiasm and guidance in the writing of this article, 
the staff editors at the Arkansas Law Review for their dedication and hard work, his family 
and friends for their constant encouragement, and his wife Sarah, with whom he shares in 
every success, for her love and support in all things. 
1. CORE WRITING TEAM, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 6-11, 13-16 (Rajendra K. Pachauri & Leo 
Meyer eds., 2015) [hereinafter IPCC REPORT 2014]. 
2. Id. at 6-8, 13-16.
3. Anthony E. Chavez, Exclusive Rights to Saving the Planet: The Patenting of
Geoengineering Inventions, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2015). 
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may help to achieve such mitigation, it is necessary for these 
patented technologies to be easily accessed, assessed, and 
improved-upon by the entities and corporations that would use 
them to combat climate change.4  Thus, to help guarantee that 
these technologies are not repressed or lost to nonuse, the United 
States should implement a limited compulsory licensing policy 
governing climate engineering patents in the fields of solar 
radiation management (SRM) and carbon-dioxide removal 
(CDR). 
II. BACKGROUND
Society’s need for large-scale intervention in the progress of 
global climate change has never been greater, and legislative 
action, both nationally in the United States and through 
international efforts, has been unable to create a governing 
environmental framework that ensures the preservation of human 
life in the not-so-distant future.5  In the hopes of enacting large-
scale change, many inventors and private companies have 
researched and developed so-called “climate engineering” 
technologies, aimed at mitigating or, in some cases, reversing the 
effects of climate change in potentially dramatic and sweeping 
ways.6  The number of patents in the realm of climate engineering 
has skyrocketed in recent years, resulting in the development of 
many technologies that may prove instrumental in combating 
climate change in the long term.7  Compulsory licensing presents 
one method by which these technologies may be efficiently 
researched, disseminated throughout the climate engineering 
industry, and improved upon. 
4. Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case
for a Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOW. L.J. 579, 582-84, 
625, 627 (2005). 
5. Jay Michaelson, Geoengineering and Climate Management: From Marginality to
Inevitability, 46 TULSA L. REV. 221, 229, 232-33, 241-42 (2010). 
6. Chavez, supra note 3, at 5-6.
7. Id. at 2, 5-7,  9-10.
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A. The Realities of Climate Change and the Necessity of
Climate Engineering Solutions 
The daunting specter of climate change looms large around 
the world.  According to the most recent report by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,8 the future risks and 
impacts caused by the changing climate span the globe and 
include: (1) increased damage from river and coastal flooding; (2) 
increased damage from extreme heat events and wildfires; (3) 
reduced crop productivity and livelihood and food security; (4) 
the increased spread of vector-borne diseases; and (5) a host of 
other potentially devastating consequences.9 
Additionally, at this point, many of these consequences are 
nearly inevitable and, potentially irreversible, even if we were to 
entirely cease the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs).10  In the 
United States specifically, if the proper steps toward mitigating or 
reversing the effects of climate change are not taken, it is very 
likely that the United States will experience substantial damage 
to its economy, the health of its citizens, and the environment, 
with “losses in some sectors . . . estimated to grow to hundreds of 
billions of dollars by the end of the century.”11 
The resultant damage of global warming to public health and 
safety can hardly be understated.  If unmitigated, projected deaths 
due to heat stroke, cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease, 
cerebrovascular disease, and kidney disorders are all likely to 
increase if warming is allowed to continue in the United States at 
its current pace.12  Additionally, likely health risks arising from 
an expected increase in the rate of “extreme events”13 such as 
droughts, wildfires, and flooding as a result of extreme 
precipitation include but are not limited to preterm birth and low 
8. IPCC REPORT 2014, supra note 1, at 13-14.
9. Id. at 14.
10. Id. at 16.
11. 2 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE 
ASSESSMENT: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1347 (2018) 
[hereinafter USGCRP ASSESSMENT 2018]. 
12. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON 
HUMAN HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES: A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT 51 (David Glick et al. 
eds., 2016) [hereinafter USGCRP ASSESSMENT 2016]. 
13. Id. at 100.
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birth weight of newborns, carbon monoxide poisoning related to 
power outages, reduced water quality and quantity, exacerbations 
of asthma, and a range of impacts on mental health.14 
1. Traditional Means of GHG Reduction and Climate Change
Mitigation Have So Far Proven Inadequate to Prevent Disaster
While this Article will not discuss international governance 
of climate change or climate change technologies in detail, it is 
important to understand that the limitations of international 
institutions and agreements have created a regulatory 
environment that, while addressing many of the concerns arising 
from climate change, does not go so far as to actually prevent the 
disastrous effects of climate change.15  To quote one disenchanted 
author, “[n]ot only has [a meaningful abatement in global GHG 
emissions] not occurred, but even the fitful starts toward such a 
policy have not even been attempted.  Kyoto, Geneva, 
Copenhagen—at some point the international community will run 
out of cities in which to fail to address climate change.”16  The 
Paris Agreement17 under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, for example, “indicates that the 
main priority is to hold the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels.”18 
While the Paris Agreement was lauded by some at its 
conception,19 it has since become clear that its provisions will not 
14. Id. at 102.
15. For a brief history of the shortcomings of international coalitions to meaningfully
reduce or plan to reduce GHG emissions, see Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Rethinking a Failing 
Framework: Adaptation and Institutional 
Rebirth for the Global Climate Change Regime, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 49 (2012) 
(“In the context of global climate change, acceptance means acknowledging that a 
centralized, consensus based, legally-binding response to climate change cannot suffice. 
Acceptance means looking beyond the treaty to find new governance strategies to address a 
massive problem that defies traditional solutions.”).   
16. Michaelson, supra note 5, at 256.
17. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
18. Jaime Nieto et al., Less Than 2 °C? An Economic-Environmental Evaluation of the
Paris Agreement, 146 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 69, 69 (2018) (emphasis omitted). 
19. See Fiona Harvey, Paris Climate Change Agreement: The World’s Greatest
Diplomatic Success,  THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2015), https://perma.cc/JDB5-F32M; Coral 
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be sufficient to reach the 2 °C goal.20  Rather, due in large part to 
increases in GHG emissions in China and India, it is more likely 
that the global average temperature will continue to rise to 
between 3 and 4 °C by 2050.21  Under such conditions there 
would be “severe and widespread impacts on unique and 
threatened systems, substantial species extinction, large risks to 
global and regional food security, consequential constraints on 
common human activities, increased likelihood of triggering 
tipping points (critical thresholds) and limited potential for 
adaptation in some cases . . . .”22 
To the extent that specific rules in international regulation of 
climate engineering technologies have been implemented, only 
the parties to the 1996 London Protocol (itself a corollary of the 
previously held London Dumping Convention) and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) have directly 
addressed geoengineering.23  Even in these cases, regulatory 
regimes have focused almost exclusively on ocean iron 
fertilization, a type of climate engineering which involves the 
adding of iron (in the form of a dissolved iron sulfate) to ocean 
waters in order to facilitate the growth of phytoplankton, which 
in turn draw carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere and into the 
ocean, slowing the effects of global warming.24 
The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the Convention) is an 
international agreement intended to control marine pollution by 
dumping, as well as to encourage regional agreements pertaining 
to the same.25  Currently, there are eighty-seven Parties to the 
Convention, including the United States, in which the 
Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 
2015),  https://perma.cc/889D-4C8P. 
20. Elizabeth Burleson, Climate-Energy Sinks and Sources: Paris Agreement and
Dynamic Federalism, 28 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016). 
21. Nieto et al., supra note 18, at 77-78, 80.
22. IPCC REPORT 2014, supra note 1, at 77.
23. Karen N. Scott, International Law in the Anthropocene: Responding to the
Geoengineering Challenge, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 309, 311, 337, 339 (2013). 
24. ERIC-MARTIAL TAKAM TAKOUGANG, IRON FERTILIZATION IN THE OCEAN AND
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE GLOBAL CARBON CYCLE 7-8  (2007). 
25. 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 
[hereinafter London Convention]. 
616 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:3 
Convention’s requirements are implemented in the Marine 
Protection, Research Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act 
(MPRSA).26  The CBD is a multilateral international treaty 
created with the intent of conserving biodiversity globally and 
encouraging the “fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
out of the [use] of genetic resources.”27  The CBD has called upon 
nations to ensure that ocean fertilization does not take place 
without adequate scientific justification28 and has emphasized the 
importance of caution in relation to ocean fertilization and 
geoengineering activities more generally.29   
However, research into ocean iron fertilization represents 
only a fraction of the total of climate engineering research,30 and 
climate engineering methods and technologies are advancing 
much more quickly than the slow cogs of an international 
regulatory regime can turn.31  Furthermore, with the United 
States’ future as a party to the Paris Agreement far from certain,32 
it is clear that the Paris Agreement, despite a noble effort, will be 
unable to rise to the challenges presented by climate change in an 
effective or meaningful way.  Thus, the necessity of developing 
climate change mitigation solutions alternative to the traditional 
international agreement is increasingly urgent. 
2. Climate Engineering as a Means of Mitigating and Reversing
Climate Change 
With the current state of international GHG emission 
regulation ineffective to stop the rapidly increasing rate of 
26. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, INT’L MAR. ORG., https://perma.cc/W5JN-3D9Q  (last visited Sept. 28, 2020); 
Ocean Dumping: International Treaties, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/5EXB-DHWD. 
27. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
28. Scott, supra note 23, at 332.
29. Id. at 332.
30. In addition to sequestration of carbon in the oceans, processes have been developed
for carbon sequestration in terrestrial soil, as well as geological disposal of CO2.  See Lisa 
Dilling et al., The Role of Carbon Cycle Observations and Knowledge in Carbon 
Management, 28 ANN. REV. ENV’T RES. 521, 526, 528 (2003).   
31. Nieto et al., supra note 18, at 79-80.
32. Lisa Friedman, Trump Administration to Begin Official Withdrawal From Paris
Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/7VYG-5826. 
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emission and ecological destruction,33 states are increasingly 
considering climate engineering options as alternatives to 
emissions reduction plans.34  The term “climate engineering,” or 
“geoengineering,”35 refers to “a broad set of methods and 
technologies operating on a large scale that aim to deliberately 
alter the climate system in order to alleviate the impacts of climate 
change.”36  Climate engineering technologies are generally 
divided into two categories: (1) carbon dioxide removal (CDR), 
which entails removing GHGs directly from the Earth’s 
atmosphere; and (2) solar radiation management (SRM), which 
involves increasing the reflectivity of the Earth’s atmosphere or 
surface.37   
The aim of CDR technologies is to remove GHGs from the 
Earth’s atmosphere.38  To this end, a number of technologies and 
polices have been proposed—varying widely in scope, cost, and 
potential environmental implications—including: (1) 
reforestation of deforested land to promote the absorption of 
carbon by foliage; (2) the sequestration of carbon as biochar or 
other organic materials; (3) the capture and transfer of GHGs 
from the atmosphere into natural “sinks” such as underground 
cave systems; (4) and the addition of iron sulfate to the oceans to 
propagate phytoplankton that consume atmospheric carbon.39 
SRM, unlike CDR, does not endeavor to decrease the 
amount of GHGs in the Earth’s atmosphere.  Instead, its aim is to 
decrease the portion of solar radiation that reaches or is absorbed 
by the surface of the planet.40  SRM covers a wide array of 
technologies and policies ranging from the mundane to the 
extraterrestrial, including managing the amount of the sun’s 
radiation that is reflected back into space by changing the color 
33. Nieto et al., supra note 18, at 80-81.
34. Scott, supra note 28, at 318.
35. The terms “climate engineering” and “geoengineering” are used interchangeably
throughout literature on the subject.  However, “climate engineering” is potentially the more 
accurate of the two and will be favored throughout this Article. 
36. IPCC REPORT 2014, supra note 1, at 89.
37. KELSI BRACMORT & RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RES. SERV., R41371,
GEOENGINEERING: GOVERNANCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 1-2 (2013). 
38. Geoengineering: Parts I, II, and III: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech.,
111th Cong. 5 (2010) [hereinafter Geoengineering: I, II, and III]. 
39. Geoengineering: I, II, and III, supra note 38 at 5-6.
40. Id. at 6.
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of our rooftops to white or even modifying portions of the earth’s 
natural land cover to make them more reflective.41  Potentially 
more extreme options include spraying sulfates into the 
stratosphere to mirror the kind of radiation absorption that occurs 
following volcanic eruptions, injecting salt water or sulfuric acid 
into the troposphere to promote cloud formation, and even 
launching reflective satellites into the Earth’s orbit.42 
3. The State of Climate Engineering Patents in the United States
Today 
In the United States, funding for research into climate 
engineering technologies is largely a private, corporate affair.  
“The United States lacks a dedicated research program, with 
existing geoengineering research efforts occurring largely as part 
of broader climate and atmospheric science programs.”43  While 
the theater of American politics features a few outspoken 
proponents of climate engineering,44 federal funding of research 
in the field remains minimal, with an estimated total of less than 
$2 million going directly to that pursuit in 2010.45  However, in 
2017, federal scientists recommended for the first time that the 
United States government begin funding research into the 
efficacy and mitigating potential of climate engineering 
technologies.46  Thus, the United States seems primed to join the 
private sector in providing meaningful funding for such 
technologies. 
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Albert C. Lin, The Missing Pieces of Geoengineering Research Governance, 
100 MINN. L. REV. 2509, 2521 (2016) (citing GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-
903, CLIMATE CHANGE: A COORDINATED STRATEGY COULD FOCUS FEDERAL 
GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH AND INFORM GOVERNANCE EFFORTS 19 (2010)).  
44. See, e.g., Alexander C. Kaufman, A Longshot 2020 Candidate Wants to Push
Geoengineering into the Climate Debate, HUFFPOST (June 26, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/TD6Y-3HG5 (“[Andrew] Yang’s embrace of geoengineering marks what 
could be a political turning point for an issue long written off as too risky and fatalistic to 
seriously consider―too much the stuff of science fiction.”).
45. Lin, supra note 43, at 2521.
46. Geoengineering: I, II, and III, supra note 38, at 48 (prepared statement of Alan
Robock) (recommending that the United States “embark on a well-funded research program 
to ‘consider geoengineering’s potential benefits, to understand its limitations, and to avoid 
ill-considered deployment.’”). 
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The Clean Air Act (CAA) is one of the few pieces of 
legislation which already allows the EPA some level of control 
over climate engineering research projects.47  Additionally, “[t]he 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) might, under 
circumstances such as public funding of research or large-scale 
outdoor SCE activities, require an environmental impact 
assessment or a programmatic environmental impact statement if 
the risks were thought to be significant.”48 
III. ANALYSIS
Although the United States Congress has historically 
shunned the notion of creating a general compulsory licensing 
statute and actual instances of compulsory licensing in the United 
States are limited, the international community provides a number 
of possible frameworks from which the United States may be able 
to borrow in crafting legislation providing specifically for the 
compulsory licensing of climate engineering patents.49  Evidence 
of Congress’s willingness over the past several decades to adopt 
limited, albeit significant, pieces of legislation with provisions for 
the compulsory licensing of patented technologies in particular 
industries suggests that, should such a provision be implemented 
for climate engineering patents, public policy considerations of 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7403 (Research, investigation, training, and other activities).  In
relevant part, the Clean Air Act provides: 
(a) Research and development program for prevention and control of air
pollution The Administrator shall establish a national research
and development program for the prevention and control of air pollution
and as part of such program shall—
(1) conduct, and promote the coordination and acceleration of, research,
investigations, experiments, demonstrations, surveys, and studies relating
to the causes, effects (including health and welfare effects), extent, prevention,
and control of air pollution[.]
42 U.S.C. § 7403. 
48. Jesse L. Reynolds et al., Solar Climate Engineering and Intellectual Property:
Toward a Research Commons, 18 MIN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 15-16 (2017). 
49. See, e.g., Naval Satarawala Chopra & Dinoo Muthappa, The Curious Case of
Compulsory Licensing in India, COMPETITION L. INT’L, Aug. 2012, at 34, 35. 
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public health, public safety, and general welfare would be 
cornerstones of that legislation.50 
A. Compulsory Licensing of Climate Engineering Patents
Despite its relative infancy, the number of patents (both
patent applications and patents granted) in the field of climate 
engineering has skyrocketed in recent years.51  One “author 
directed a review of USPTO records to determine trends in 
applications for and granting of patents involving climate-
engineering technologies[,]” including both SRM and CDR 
technologies.52  The findings of the study were as follows: 
[B]efore 2008, the combined number of patent
applications and patents granted for geoengineering
technologies did not exceed twenty in a single year.
However, the total exceeded forty in 2009, and
eventually increased to more than one hundred in 2013.
Moreover, the rate at which the USPTO has granted
these patents has similarly increased.  For instance, the
USPTO never granted more than ten such patents
annually before 2010.  Four years later, the annual
number of geoengineering patents granted increased
nearly tenfold.  In sum, both the number of patents
granted and applications filed illustrate startling growth
over the past four years.53
Of these patent applications and grants, CDR methods 
constituted more than 90%, with “particle-dispersion” and “solar-
ray-reflection” technologies constituting only 4% and 2% of all 
climate geoengineering patents, respectively.54  Along with the 
rise in number of climate engineering patents, a number of 
authors have raised serious concerns that the patenting of climate 
engineering technologies could result in an industry where 
development of the technologies that could be used to save the 
50. See Susan Vastano Vaughan, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Under
TRIPS: What Standard of Compensation?, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 87, 88-89 
(2001).  
51. Chavez, supra note 3, at 5-6.
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id. at 10.
54. Id. at 10-11.
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planet is actually hindered, and access to those technologies 
limited.55 The “[p]atenting of geoengineering technologies could 
have serious negative impacts by creating a culture of secrecy that 
could delay much-needed developments.”56 
Climate engineering initiatives undertaken by private 
companies create the potential for these technologies to be 
deployed without a thorough assessment of the ecological risk 
involved.57  Because of the potentially rapid and widespread 
ecological effects of some climate engineering technologies, 
possession of these technologies by a small number of private 
individuals or corporations is certainly troubling.58  Furthermore, 
just as allowing a small number of individuals to have access to 
powerful climate engineering technologies creates an 
environment where the potential detrimental effects of climate 
engineering are amplified or unrestricted, such an environment 
also prevents the public at large from enjoying climate 
engineering’s potential benefits.59  One author has noted that 
“[f]oreseeably, potential trade in geoengineering-related goods 
and services would be highly sensitive, given that the public-
goods character of climate change mitigation and adaptation 
efforts could potentially be hampered by considerations around 
the protection of private interests.”60 
Namely, these considerations include private organizations 
restricting use of their climate engineering technologies by other 
individuals or organizations with the purpose of maximizing the 
profitability of those technologies.  However, exclusive use in 
cases like these could potentially come at the cost of meaningful 
development of those technologies.61  This possibility is 
particularly troubling in the field of climate engineering.  With 
55. See, e.g., Daniela Lai, Deployment of Geoengineering by the Private and Public
Sector: Can the Risks of Geoengineering Ever Be Effectively Regulated?, 37 LOY. L.A. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 341, 342 (2016); Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis-Yelaghotis, 
Geoengineering a Future for Humankind: Some Technical and Ethical Considerations, 2012 
CCLR 128, 130 (2012); Chavez, supra note 3, at 9. 
56. Lai, supra note 55, at 361.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See Leal-Arcas & Filis-Yelaghotis, supra note 55, at 141.
60. Id. at 144.
61. See Chavez, supra note 3, at 13-14.
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the state of international deliberations on the subject of reductions 
in GHG emissions unable to provide binding, meaningful 
progress so as to adequately mitigate or reverse the effects of 
climate change, it is increasingly necessary to supplement any 
such international agreements with well-researched technologies.  
Under the patents system, patent holders are provided twenty 
years of completely exclusive use of their designs, at the end of 
which they are required to disclose their inventions, thus 
“facilitat[ing] the development of successive inventions, thereby 
fostering technological advancement.”62  However, climate 
engineering technologies are distinguishable from the everyday 
inventions due to their incredible value, not just economically to 
those firms able to secure adequate funding to research them, but 
also as a potential solution to the wide range of health and public 
safety risks associated with unmitigated climate change.63  Thus, 
there is a compelling public policy interest in ensuring that these 
technologies can be distributed throughout the industry quickly 
and efficiently. 
“Compulsory licensing” refers generally “to the grant of 
permission for an enterprise seeking to use another’s intellectual 
property to do so without the consent of its proprietor.”64  
Historical instances of compulsory licenses in the United States 
are limited and, while a number of general compulsory licensing 
laws have been proposed in Congress,65 the United States, unlike  
many of its trading partners,66 does not include a general 
provision on compulsory licensing in its patent codes.67 
62. Id. at 9.
63. See generally Leal-Arcas & Filis-Yelaghotis, supra note 55, at 141.
64. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RES. SERV., R43266, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF
PATENTED INVENTIONS 1 (2014). 
65. See Kristopher Lancial, Compulsory Patent Licensing:  The Next Step in Adapting
Patents to the Technological Age, 18 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 59, 64 (2013); A. Jason 
Mirabito, Compulsory Patent Licensing for the United States: A Current Proposal, 57 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 404, 431-32 (1975). 
66. THOMAS, supra note 64, at 9.
67. Id. at 6.
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B. International Law on Compulsory Licensing
Although it lacks a universal compulsory licensing 
provision, the United States is party to the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPs 
Agreement),68 an international agreement that went into effect in 
1995 and “significantly affected the manner in which the 
international community utilizes compulsory patents.”69  In 
relevant part, the TRIPs Agreement provides “for other use of the 
subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right 
holder, including use by the government or third parties 
authorized by the government[.]”70  Additionally, nations which 
are party to the TRIPs Agreement are authorized to institute 
measures that “prevent the abuses which might result from the 
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by [a] patent,”71 and 
Article 30 of the TRIPs Agreement allows for “limited exceptions 
to . . . exclusive rights”72 when “necessary to protect public health 
and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance”73 and to prevent “abuse of intellectual property 
rights.”74 
The lack of an overarching compulsory licensing provision 
in United States patent law reflects a general hesitancy in the 
United States to issue such licensing.75  The United States 
generally does not utilize compulsory licensing as an instrument 
against private corporations for the sake of competition, reserving 
it as a punitive measure against corporations that are found to 
have violated antitrust law.76   
68. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Sept. 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1197. 
69. Lancial, supra note 65, at 63.
70. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note
68. 
71. Paris Convention for the Protect. of Indus. Prop., Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583.
72. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note
68. 
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPs Agreement:
Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941, 953 (2000). 
76. Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to
Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH 389, 392 n.13 (2002). 
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The sets of legislation on compulsory licensing in other 
nations, however, provide a much more vibrant landscape to 
explore, particularly in some developing nations.77  Consistent 
with both the TRIPs Agreement and the Paris Agreement, the vast 
majority of nations belonging to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) have adopted compulsory licensing provisions.78  In 
India, for example: 
At any time after the expiration of three years from the 
date a patent is granted, any interested person may make 
an application to the Registrar of the Patent Office 
seeking the grant of a compulsory license to work the 
patented invention . . . .  In determining whether or not 
to grant such a license, the Registrar takes into account: 
(1) the nature of the invention, the time which has
elapsed since the granting of the patent, and the
measures already taken by the patentee or any licensee
to make full use of the invention;
(2) the ability of the applicant to work the invention to
the public advantage; and
(3) the capacity of the applicant to undertake the risk in
providing capital and working the invention, if the
application is granted.79
Such compulsory licenses are typically applied to patents 
registered in industries closely tied to public health and safety.80  
For example, the first compulsory license granted by the Indian 
Patents Office was granted in 2012 for the manufacture of a 
particular pharmaceutical.81 
The rationale behind compulsory licensing for the sake of 
public health and safety is clear—if a patented product or process 
is necessary to address a critical public health concern, it is in the 
public’s best interest that the product or process be made available 
to companies that would build on and distribute it, thus addressing 
the public health concern.82  In such cases, the inventor’s interest 
77. See, e.g., Chopra & Muthappa, supra note 49, at 35.
78. Saunders, supra note 76, at 438.
79. 6 DAVID M. EPSTEIN, ECKSTROM’S LICENSING IN FOR.EIGN & DOMESTIC.
OPERATIONS § 39:28 (2020). 
80. Chopra & Muthappa, supra note 49, at 37.
81. Id. at 34.
82. Vaughan, supra note 50, at 88-89.
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in the patented product may be “subordinate” to that of the 
public.83  However, there is not a precise or agreed-upon 
definition of “public interest” in the international community as 
it relates to compulsory licensing. 
In nations where compulsory licensing is more common, 
public interest-based compulsory licenses are generally issued 
exclusively to regulate products that are considered especially 
valuable to the general public.84  These licenses usually deal with 
inventions and technologies relating to national defense, public 
health, public safety, and/or general welfare.85  In these areas, the 
particular interest serviced by an inventor’s patented invention is 
more likely to be deemed superior to the inventor’s interests in 
his or her intellectual property.86  In the instances when the United 
States has imposed compulsory licenses, it has often been as a 
remedy for violations of antitrust laws.87 
One author connected the differing sentiments of various 
nations toward compulsory licensing provisions to national 
identity: the United States’ use of compulsory licensing as a 
remedy for antitrust violations “reflect[s] the value of free 
enterprise and competition in the United States[,]” while in the 
Soviet Union, on the other hand, any technology is subject to a 
compulsory license if it is deemed “of special importance to the 
State.”88  Reflecting their shared common law ancestry, Canada 
and the United Kingdom all share very similar laws with respect 
to compulsory licensing, which provide a means for mandating 
licensing of technologies that are not being worked, evidence of 
a patent-holder’s “refusal to deal.”89  The United Kingdom also 
recognizes an important public interest in the availability of 
83. Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666, 670 (1988). 
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Lawrence Schlam, Compulsory Royalty-Free Licensing as an Antitrust
Remedy for Patent Fraud: Law, Policy and the Patent-Antitrust Interface Revisited, 7 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 501-02 (1998). 
88. Fauver, supra note 83, at 670-71 (internal quotations omitted).
89. See id. at 672.
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affordable materials to produce food, medicine, and medical 
equipment.90 
Developing countries may also implement compulsory 
licenses on foreign investors’ inventions so as to access 
technologies that the pre-industrialized countries could not 
develop otherwise.91  However, this limits the amount of control 
such investors are able to exercise over a patented invention, 
which has the effect of potentially driving away investors.  
Legislatures in developing nations must, therefore, take these 
opposing interests into account in creating compulsory licensing 
legislation that both assuages the intellectual property concerns of 
these foreign investors and expands access to the new 
technologies which these investors own, and which can be critical 
to their industrialization and further economic development.92   
Compulsory licensing essentially “compels a patent owner 
to allow certain others to practice the invention otherwise 
protected by a patent.”93  In such cases, the government 
essentially usurps the patent holder and takes over the patent 
holder’s right to grant a license to a third party or some 
government agency.94  Generally, the patent holder subsequently 
receives a “reasonable royalty” for the license, as if the patent 
holder had voluntarily licensed his or her invention.95 
Compulsory licensing allows more widespread access to 
certain inventions, which furthers innovation and may 
compensate for situations in which a particular field has failed to 
disseminate important technologies, as in cases where an 
individual or corporation with monopoly access to a patented 
invention exercises that power but chooses not to practice the 
technology.96  Such non-use can create an environment that stifles 
90. Id. at 671.
91. Id.
92. Id.  For a more expansive discussion of compulsory licensing and patent systems
in developing nations see generally Fauver, supra note 83. 
93. Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the Rescue: Disasters and Patent Law, 10
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 309, 336 (2007). 
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with Intellectual
Property Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH & ENVTL. L. 
51, 59 (2005). 
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technological advancement and impairs future researchers’ 
attempts to continue innovation by acquiring and building on 
patented technologies.97  Furthermore, compulsory licenses can 
be especially critical to promoting continued innovation in fields 
which touch on issues of public health and safety or otherwise 
have some significant social value.98 
Even so, the United States has been generally hesitant to 
enact legislation to implement a general provision for compulsory 
licensing.99  There have, however, been a limited number of 
instances where compulsory licensing has been used to resolve 
legal disputes.  Such was the case in 1956, when the United States 
negotiated agreements with International Business Machines 
(IBM) and American Telegraph & Telephone (AT&T) to license 
their inventions.100  The compulsory licensing of these patents is 
now recognized for “fostering the rapid growth of the 
semiconductor industry.”101   
The United States has dabbled in compulsory licensing not 
only on an individual basis with specific private entities, but has 
also enacted limited, albeit significant pieces of legislation with 
compulsory licensing provisions.  The Clean Air Act (CAA),102 
the Atomic Energy Act (AEA),103 and the Plant Variety 
Protection Act (PVPA)104, all contain conditional provisions 
under which certain types of technology must be licensed for 
public use.  In particular, the Clean Air Act provides for the 
97. See id. at 60.
98. Rose, supra note 4, at 579-627.
99. Id.
100. Chavez, supra note 3, at 22 (“The agreement with AT&T required that it license
at reasonable royalties all patents controlled by a subsidiary, Bell Systems.  Similarly, the 
IBM decree required that it grant nonexclusive, nontransferable licenses for all of its patents 
to any applicant at reasonable royalties.  Accordingly, the applicant was obligated to cross 
license its patents to IBM on similar terms.”). 
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (Providing mandatory licensing of air pollution prevention
inventions under Title 42, the Public Health and Welfare). 
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (Allowing for compulsory licenses of any patent which is
determined to be “affected with the public interest” so long as its primary purpose is “the 
production or utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy[.]”). 
104. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321, 2404 (Enabling the Secretary of the United States Department
of Agriculture to declare a compulsory license allowing the use of a patented variety of plant 
for two years in limited cases where such a license is necessary to maintain a sufficient food 
supply). 
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compulsory licensing of patents for pollution control devices, 
acknowledging even in 1970 that technologies with the potential 
to substantially reduce emissions are critical to public health and 
safety.105  Recognizing that the aim of the Clean Air Act—”to 
improve air quality through the implementation of a regulatory 
scheme designed to stimulate private development of air-
pollution-control technology”—would result in the invention of 
critically important technologies, Congress included a means by 
which individual states may acquire compulsory licenses to 
inventions in furtherance of attaining federally-mandated air-
quality standards.106  “If the state can satisfy a set of requirements, 
then the U.S. Attorney General certifies that application to a 
district court, which may order the patentee to license the 
invention upon reasonable terms.”107 
“Compulsory licensing schemes are justified on the ground 
that they increase public access to inventions.”108  Should the 
United States seek to apply compulsory licenses to particular 
climate engineering technologies, this is likely the theory under 
which those compulsory licenses would be justified.  Opponents 
of compulsory licensing have argued that this theory is not 
grounded in reality; rather, that the type of patent nonuse, or 
suppression, that might justify a compulsory license is mere 
myth,109 and that “[a]nyone who invests the time and money to 
develop a new invention and goes through the trouble to obtain 
patent protection would probably exploit the invention to realize 
a return on that investment.”110  There have, however, been a 
number of instances of such patent suppression in the United 
States, including in the fields of pharmaceuticals and automotive 
engineering.111  Thus, it is to the advantage of American markets 
105. Fauver, supra note 86, at 670.
106. Chavez, supra note 3, at 24.
107. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7608).  “The Clean Air Act requires a party to satisfy three
requirements to obtain a license.  First, the patented technology is not ‘reasonably available’ 
yet ‘necessary to comply with an air-quality standard; second, ‘no reasonable alternative 
methods’ exist; and third, the unavailability of such technology may cause a ‘substantial 
lessening of competition.’”  Id. at 24 n.204. 
108. Fauver, supra note 83, at 671.
109. Id. at 674-75.
110. Id. at 675.
111. For a discussion of the history of patent nonuse and how such nonuse leads to
patent suppression in the United States, see Saunders, supra note 76. 
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and the public to have a system in place to prevent such patent 
suppression in the field of climate engineering and a system that 
embraces the idea of compulsory licensing on climate engineering 
technologies could potentially do so. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Mitigating the effects of climate change in the United States 
and throughout the world is vitally important to guarantee public 
health and safety in the coming decades.  One avenue that society 
has yet to meaningfully explore on a large scale in order to 
achieve that mitigation is climate engineering technology.  This 
technology, when properly developed, tested, and distributed, 
may unlock new insights into society’s efforts to counter the 
effects of unmitigated climate change.  Thus, it is necessary for 
these patented technologies to be easily accessed, assessed, and 
improved-upon by the entities and corporations that would use 
them to combat climate change. 
Additionally, the limitations of international institutions and 
agreements in combating climate change have created a 
regulatory environment that does not go far enough to actually 
prevent the impeding disastrous effects of climate change.  Thus, 
the United States seems primed to embrace not just meaningful 
climate engineering efforts, but to guarantee that the benefits of 
climate engineering technologies are available to the public 
through the limited use of compulsory licensing in the industry.  
The United States’ previous dabbling in compulsory licensing, as 
well as robust compulsory licensing frameworks in other nations, 
provide a clear path toward implementing the doctrine effectively 
in the United States, and doing so could bring the United States 
and the world one step closer to combating the long-term effects 
of climate change.  
